The affect space of Pathoscape allows mapping of every possible feeling state in a two-dimensional plane. The number of emotion labels in even the most expressive natural language corresponds to a small fraction of the affect space. This range of feelings is continuous; however, the feelings mapped to loci in the plane and then described by emotion labels are fuzzy but discrete states that feel a certain way. The range of feelings is like a spectrum, from which patches can be picked out and named different colors. Just like color words, emotion labels and emotional concepts may differ by languages and cultures, but the spectrum of possible feeling states that can be experienced is universal. Pathoscape represents the whole range of possible feeling states. Any emotion labels used to specify and define feeling states within the affect space are a matter of personal opinion. However, there should be a broad consensus about the general arrangement of emotion labels, especially labels for those states that are widely considered basic emotions. 

     Associating each of the four quadrants with the very broad attitude labels wanting, liking, not wanting, and not liking seems obvious and uncontroversial. Likewise, subdividing the quadrants into 16 overlapping broad categories is not problematic. Before attempting to specify narrower ranges of feelings, however, it is important to clarify some difficult ideas about the problems of using emotion words to label the locations of feeling states. Locations in the affect space characterize how states feel (in terms of protovalence and impulse only), but they do not define states as the semantic concepts denoted by any emotion word that might be used to label them. In other words, the meanings of any emotion labels should not be confused with the feelings they label. What a feeling means to someone is something apart from the subjective experience of the feeling itself. An emotion is characterized by the feeling, but the feeling is not defined by the emotion label. In fact, more than one emotion may feel a certain way but mean different things. Furthermore, because of the ambiguities inherent in language, there are many other ways linguistic labels can cause confusion when referring to feeling states. It is even possible for a single word to refer to more than one feeling. Disgust, for example, has both potential and actual forms that are not differentiated in English; however, this same label could be used to describe certain aversive states in quadrant III (not wanting) as well as certain bitter states in quadrant IV (not liking). Yet ill-defined disgust is often considered a basic emotion. Likewise, feeling anxious can mean feeling anxiety (quadrant III) or feeling eagerness (quadrant I). Furthermore, some words do not describe specific states, but rather describe changes in states. Labels like disappointment and frustration, for example, indicate the stimulus itself is a change from positive to negative protovalence, typically from quadrant I to quadrant IV. There are also labels that are commonly thought of as emotions that refer to combinations, syndromes, or even whole ranges of states. Love, for example, is not a unitary emotion that has a single feeling state. Likewise, happiness refers to a vague, smeared out region around joy (encompassing optimism and cheer), and the same with sadness around misery (encompassing pessimism and sorrow). In fact, these two emotions may refer to many states that are positive or negative, respectively, not just high-agency states. Some linguistic labels for feelings can also cause problems by conflating the stimulus of the emotion with the feeling itself. The stimulus of an emotion is the actual or prospective state of affairs the emotion is about, not how the emotion feels. Claiming to feel cheated versus how one feels about being cheated, for example, a case about which one might appropriately claim to feel angry. The stimuli of emotions do not have to be external; they may also be other internal cognitive or affective states, so it is very often the case that emotions are about emotions, in which case it can be particularly difficult to label such a higher-order feeling state and avoid confusing how it feels with the meaning or significance of the feeling. Additionally, there are labels such as apathy, boredom, and calmness, that can indicate states with exceedingly low intensities, such that any subtle difference in feeling can be easily overshadowed by connotations of the labels. With these caveats in mind, the figure below is an attempt to label the affect space more thoroughly, making a particular effort to choose emotion labels that have compelling complements, conjugates, and polar opposites. 

     The overlapping ovals and the continually changing ring of colored circles are meant to illustrate the fuzziness of the nearly synonymous emotion labels that gradually blend into one another around the circle while expanding on the characteristics of the 16 broad categories. My specific choices might not be shared by others, but reflect the connotations these words have to me. Nevertheless, I expect broad agreement with the overall structure. The labels for increasingly urgent states might be thought by some instead to represent increasing intensity, but I placed them as I understood their differences in urgency, because it is possible for these different states under some circumstances to have the same intensity, in which case they would need to be distinguished by urgency. All the feelings labeled can have correlates that are higher and lower in intensity, but those labels are not shown. Some labels are such near synonyms, it is difficult to decide if they better fit with a stimulus that has potential or actual value ― blissful and elated, for example. In this case I placed elated in quadrant II, because the word has connotations of delight and glee. Some might object to omitting a label like love, but it is not a unitary emotion; it is more like a syndrome that can include such disparate emotions as desire, adoration, and even worry. Similarly, it is also possible to have mixed emotions about the same stimulus, but it seems only one emotion can be attended at a time, even if switching between them can be rapid. I believe, for example, that mania is a syndrome of mixed emotions, having properties distinct from euphoria. Despite the implications of the term bipolar disorder, I believe mania is not the opposite of depression, and that the elevated feelings associated with mania are secondary to highly urgent and extroverted feelings, which are themselves extremely positively valenced. This primary extroverted aspect can be present in a bipolar episode with mixed features, including racing thoughts, rapid speech, or aggression, whereas the high agency, euphoric state is not present. I therefore include manic primarily as a highly urgent and impulsive state. Finally, each state in Pathoscape is worded to fit into the statement "I am/feel ___ that stimulus," or "I ___ that stimulus." For example: "I am furious that he wronged me," or "I dread that I will feel pain." This emphasizes the fact that an emotional stimulus is not just a stimulating physical object, but rather a state of affairs. An emotion can be viewed as a propositional attitude about a state of affairs that can be stated as a proposition, even if not always stated as such in practice.